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Abstract
If financial markets displayed the informational efficiency postulated in the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), ar-
bitrage operations would be self-extinguishing. The present paper considers arbitrage sequences in foreign exchange
(FX) markets, in which trading platforms and information are fragmented. In Kozyakin et al. (2010) and Cross
et al. (2012) it was shown that sequences of triangular arbitrage operations in FX markets containing 4 curren-
cies and trader-arbitrageurs tend to display periodicity or grow exponentially rather than being self-extinguishing.
This paper extends the analysis to 5 or higher-order currency worlds. The key findings are that in a 5-currency
world arbitrage sequences may also follow an exponential law as well as display periodicity, but that in higher-
order currency worlds a double exponential law may additionally apply. There is an “inheritance of instability”
in the higher-order currency worlds. Profitable arbitrage operations are thus endemic rather that displaying the
self-extinguishing properties implied by the EMH.
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1. Introduction
Arbitrage operations are profitable if a good or asset can be bought for a lower price than that for which it
can be sold. Such operations are distinct from speculation in that there is little or no capital or risk exposure.
Arbitrage profits are made by trading on prices that are already posted, rather than by trading on speculative
guesses about what prices posted in the future might be. The New Palgrave Dictionary defines arbitrage as “an
investment strategy that guarantees a positive payoff in some contingency with no possibility of negative payoff
and with no net investment”, Dybvig and Ross (2008).
In the economics and finance literature the exploitation of profitable arbitrage opportunities is postulated to
eliminate price discrepancies between goods and assets that are in some sense “identical.” This postulate, that
arbitrage operations are self-extinguishing, implies the “law of one price”, this terminology having been coined in
the purchasing power parity explanation of foreign exchange rates, Cassel (1916). A related no-arbitrage condition
is that of covered interest parity (CIP), whereby the ratio of forward to spot exchange rates for currency pairs is
equal to the ratio of the interest rates on comparable assets denominated in the two currencies over the forward
period in question (Keynes, 1923, p. 13). No-arbitrage condition form the bedrock of mainstream theory in finance,
as embodied in the Modigliani–Miller theorem regarding corporate capital structure, the Black–Scholes model of
option pricing and in the arbitrage pricing model of asset prices, Ross (1978).
The present paper deals with arbitrage processes in foreign exchange (FX) markets. The Bank for International
Settlements (BIS, 2011, p. 5) provides a useful classification of arbitrage strategies in such markets. Classical
arbitrage aims to exploit discrepancies between actual exchange rates and no-arbitrage conditions, such as that the
exchange rates for currency pairs are consistent with their cross-exchange rates. Latency arbitrage aims to exploit
time lags between trades being initiated and FX price quotes being revised. Liquidity imbalance arbitrage attempts
to take advantage of order book imbalances between different trading platforms. Complex event arbitrage is geared
towards properties of FX rates, such as mean-reversion and momentum, or towards systematic patterns in the
way FX response to new information being released. This paper focuses on triangular arbitrage operations, arising
from discrepancies between the exchange rates for currency pairs and the cross-exchange rates for the currencies
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involved. To simplify the analysis we ignore the difference between FX bid and ask prices and do not take account
of the cost of executing FX transactions. For evidence that there are arbitrage profits to be made, net of bid-ask
spreads and transactions costs, see Marshall et al. (2007) and Akram et al. (2008).
If the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), formulated by Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1970), applied to FX
markets, exchange rates would reflect all the information relevant to their determination and there would be no
profits to be had from FX arbitrage trades. This would involve an “arbitrage paradox” (Grossman and Stiglitz,
1976): if arbitrage opportunities did not exist, there would be no incentive for FX market participants to monitor
exchange rates, so profitable arbitrage opportunities could well arise. There is also the “no trade” problem. If FX
markets were informationally efficient, as the EMH postulates, you would expect to observe periods in which FX
transactions volumes dwindled when no new information was being generated. Instead FX transactions volumes
remain substantial, even during quiescent market conditions.
The microstructure of FX markets is fragmented, implying that information about profitable arbitrage oppor-
tunities is also likely to be fragmented. The contrast is between the “lit” areas where information on some of
the electronic trading platforms is publicly available, and the “dark pools”, where information on FX transac-
tions conducted directly between banks and their end-user clients is initially private. BIS data for 2010 document
this FX market fragmentation. Electronic booking systems (EBS), such as the London-based EBS and Reuters,
took 18.8% of global turnover; multi-bank electronic communication networks (ECNs), such as the US-based Cur-
renex, Hotspot FX and FXall, accounted for 11.1% of global turnover; and single-bank ECNs took 11.4% of global
turnover. Inter-dealer trades, most of which are executed electronically, constituted 18.5% of turnover. The “dark
pools” tend to be in the non-electronic execution segments of the market, with customer-direct transactions be-
tween banks and end-user clients taking 24.4% of global turnover, and voice-broker trades accounting for 15.9% of
global turnover (BIS, 2010, p. 16).
There is also evidence of “home bias” in FX transactions. FX trades initiated in the US and Canada tend
to take place during North American trading hours, those initiated in Japan and Australia tend to occur during
Asian trading hours, and so on (D’Souza, 2008, Table 2). Estimation of impulse-response functions for the way
exchange rates respond to local order flow data indicate that “dealers operating both at the same time and in
the same geographic region as fundamentally driven customers have a natural informational advantage” (D’Souza,
2008, pp. 23–24). In a similar vein, Covrig and Melvin (2002) found that Tokyo-based traders had an informational
advantage over foreign-based traders regarding the course of the Japanese yen exchange rates.
In previous papers, Kozyakin et al. (2010) and Cross et al. (2012), the implications of this fragmentation
of information on FX markets were analysed by a combinatorial analysis of the different possible sequences of
arbitrage operations. The “home bias” asymmetry in information is represented by having FX trader-arbitrageurs
initially know only the exchange rates involving their own domestic currency. The question is then whether
triangular arbitrage transactions are profitable because the cross-exchange rates are misaligned in relation to the
exchange rates for the currency pairs. The arbitrage sequences that will be pursued would depend on which trader-
arbitrageur first discovers the mis-alignment of the cross-exchange rates. The arbitrage operations are triangular,
so, for example, if the US dollar trader were to discover that the euro–sterling rate was out of line with exchange
rates for the dollar–euro and dollar–sterling currency pairs, an arbitrage profit could be made by selling dollars for
sterling and using the sterling to buy euros.
In the 3-currency case arbitrage operations are reasonable straightforward. The order in which trader-arbi-
trageurs discover information about cross-exchange rate discrepancies makes a difference to the arbitrage sequences
that will be pursued, and to the resulting new no-arbitrage ensemble of exchange rates that will emerge, but one
arbitrage transaction suffices to eliminate the arbitrage opportunity. The 4-currency case is significantly more
complicated, there being 4P3 = 24 possible triangular arbitrage operations. In Kozyakin et al. (2010) and Cross
et al. (2012) it was shown that in this 4-currency world arbitrage sequences tend to be periodic in nature or
display exponential behaviour, showing no tendency to approach a no-arbitrage ensemble of exchange rates in
which there are no profitable opportunities. The intuitive explanation for this periodicity is that the exploitation
of one arbitrage opportunity has “ripple effects,” disturbing the ensemble of exchange rates and so creating further
active arbitrage opportunities.
The task of the present paper is to extend the analysis of FX arbitrage operations to a world of d-currencies,
where d is the number of currencies and trade-arbitrageurs involved. One key finding is that in the (d ≥ 5)-currency
case the surprising result is that the arbitrage sequences may follow a double exponential process as well as the
periodicity or exponential behaviour observed in the 4-currency case. There is thus an “inheritance of instability”
as we move to higher-order currency worlds.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 a mathematical formulation of the problem is given. In
Section 3 it is shown that the arbitrage dynamics, initially specified in terms of some nonlinear operations, can be
described by asynchronous matrix products. For the general case of an arbitrary number of trader-arbitrageurs the
properties of the resulting matrices are studied in Section 4. The exposition of Sections 2 and 3 follows the work
2
of Kozyakin et al. (2010). In Section 5 basic results from Kozyakin et al. (2010) and Cross et al. (2012) about the
arbitrage dynamics for an FX currency market with 4 traders are recalled. In particular, these results demonstrate
that the exchange rates in a foreign exchange currency market with 4 traders, under appropriate choice of the
arbitrage sequences, display periodic or exponential behaviour. In Section 6 we construct an example showing that
in the case of 5 or more arbitrage traders the situation may be, in a sense, even worse — in this case the exchange
rates may change not only periodically or grow exponentially, as in the case of 4 traders, but they may grow in
accordance with a double exponential law. In Appendix A and Appendix B an explicit form for all the matrices
involved in the description of the arbitrage dynamics for the cases d = 4 and d = 5, respectively, is presented.
2. Statement of the Problem
Consider a foreign exchange (FX) currency market involving d currencies involving the exchange rates rij of
the i-th currency to the j-th currency, j 6= i. Naturally, the value of rji, the exchange rate of the j-th currency to
the i-th currency, is reciprocal to the value of rij :
rji =
1
rij
.
The exchange rates vary with time depending on the state of the market and on the relations between the
exchange rates. For instance, if at some moment the trader of the currency i realises that exchange rate of the i-th
currency to the j-th currency, via the intermediate currency k, may bring a profit, i.e.,
rik · rkj > rij , i 6= j, k 6= i, j,
then he can establish a new exchange rate for the currency
rij,new = rik · rkj .
So, in what follows, we will suppose that the exchange rates in our arbitrage system are updated in accordance
with the following law:
rij,new = max {rik · rkj , rij,old} ,
rji,new =
1
rij,new
,
and simultaneously the exchange rates for only one pair (i, j) of currencies may be updated.
By introducing the auxiliary quantities
aij = log rij , ∀i 6= j,
it is possible to pass from the “multiplicative” statement of the problem about arbitrage dynamics given above to
the “additive” statement of the problem, which in this case will look as follows. Given a skew-symmetric d × d
matrix A = (aij), for a triplet of pairwise distinct indices (i, j, k), i 6= j, k 6= i, j, the elements aij and aji are
updated in accordance with the following law:
aij,new = max {aik + akj , aij,old} , (1)
aji,new = −aij,new. (2)
The triplet of indices ω = (i, j, k), i 6= j, k 6= i, j, will be called the arbitrage rule.
3. Linear Reformulation
Since by (1) and (2) the element aij of the matrix A is updated “simultaneously” with the updating of the
symmetric element aji, then it is reasonable to speak about updating of the pair (aij , aji). Then, according to (1)
and (2), the pair of elements (aij , aji) can be updated by one of two following scenarios. Either at first the element
aij is updated in accordance with (1), and then the element aji is updated in accordance with (2), or at first the
element aji is updated by the formula
aji,new = max {ajk + aki, aji,old} ,
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which, in view of the skew-symmetry of the matrix A, leads to the formula
aji,new = max {−akj − aik, − aij,old} = −min {aik + akj , aij,old} ,
and then the element aij is updated as follows
aij,new = −aji,new,
which amounts to the final expression for aij,new:
aij,new = min {aik + akj , aij,old} . (3)
Formulae (1) and (3) show that in the process of updating of the pair (aij , aji) the element aij , independently
of the scenario of updating, either is not changed (and then the matrix A is not changed, too) or this element may
change its value as follows:
aij,new = aik + akj , (4)
whereas the symmetric element aji changes its value in accordance with (2) which is equivalent to
aji,new = ajk + aki. (5)
So, the following lemma is proved.
Lemma 1. If the arbitrage law (1) and (2) holds then any pair of elements (aij , aji) either is not changed or is
changed by the linear law (4), (5).
Clearly, the converse assertion is also true.
Lemma 2. If a pair of elements (aij , aji) were to be updated by the law (4), (5), i.e.,
(aij , aji) 7→ (aij,new, aji,new)
then one of two scenarios of updating of the pair of elements (aij , aji) can be selected (at first updating aij by formula
(1) and then adjusting aji by the formula (2); or at first updating aji by the formula (1) and then adjusting aij by
the formula (2)), under which the same pair of new elements (aij,new, aji,new) will be obtained. Namely,
• if aij,new > aij after updating the pair (aij , aji) then, to interpret such an updating by the arbitrage law (1)
and (2), one should first apply formula (1) and then formula (2);
• if aij,new < aij after updating the pair (aij , aji) then, to interpret such an updating by the arbitrage law (1)
and (2), one should first apply formula (2) and then formula (1);
• and last, if aij,new = aij then the order of updating the elements of the pair (aij , aji), as well as whether such
an updating took place at all, is inessential.
The previous lemmata indicate that under the max-statement of the problem, as well as under its linear
reformulation, it suffices to investigate only the dynamics of the pairs (aij , aji) of mutually symmetric elements
since such an analysis allows us to reproduce also the scenarios of intra-pair updating of the elements aij under the
max-statement of the problem.
4. Asynchronous Matrix Products
Define in the space of all skew-symmetric d× d matrices A = (aij) a basis {eij}, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ d, by enumerating
in some order the upper off-diagonal elements of such matrices. For example, let us define the element eij ,
1 ≤ i < j ≤ d, of this basis as the skew-symmetric matrix whose element aij is equal to 1 and the others vanish.
Then each matrix in this basis can be represented as a column-vector:
x = {a12, a13, . . . , a1d, a23, a24, . . . a2d, . . . , ad−1,d}T ∈ Rd(d−1)/2, (6)
and computation of the new vector xnew by the old one xold will be defined by the expression
xnew = Bωxold. (7)
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Here the matrix Bω is determined by the arbitrage rule ω = (i, j, k) applied to this step of updating and has the
form typical in the theory of asynchronous systems, see, e.g., Asarin et al. (1992): all of its rows except one coincide
with the rows of the identity matrix while one row contains exactly two non-zero elements specified by formula (4).
If we define on the space of vectors (6) the usual Euclidean inner-product 〈·, ·〉, and then use the matrix Bω in
(7) corresponding to the arbitrage rule ω = (i, j, k), we will get the following representation1:
Bωx =

x+ 〈−eij − eki + ekj ,x〉eij for k < i < j,
x+ 〈−eij + eik + ekj ,x〉eij for i < k < j,
x+ 〈−eij + eik − ejk,x〉eij for i < j < k.
(8)
Since all the vectors (6) are column-vectors, then the relations (8) can also be rewritten in the following matrix
form:
Bω =

I − eij(eTij + eTki − eTkj) for k < i < j,
I − eij(eTij − eTik − eTkj) for i < k < j,
I − eij(eTij − eTik + eTjk) for i < j < k,
(9)
where the upper index T denotes transposition of a vector or a matrix.
Let us make some remarks resulting from formulae (8) and (9).
Remark 1. Each matrix Bω is a matrix with integer entries. This means that, when considering convergence
issues for the matrix products involving such matrices, the convergence, provided that it takes place, will be always
achieved by a finite number of steps.
Remark 2. Each matrix Bω is a projector.
Remark 3. Since the procedure of sequential updating of vectors x according to (7) linearly depends on the initial
vectors, then to analyse their convergence it suffices to consider only the initial vectors taking the values of the
standard basis vectors {eij}. Then the whole problem becomes an integer-valued problem, i.e, a combinatorial
one.
Remark 4. The procedure of constructing the matrices Bω is very similar to that of constructing the so-called
“mixtures” of matrices under investigation in asynchronous systems Asarin et al. (1992). The difference is that in
Asarin et al. (1992) each coordinate of the state vector xnew in (7) is updated by a single rule, whereas in our case
each coordinate of the state vector xnew in (7) may be updated in accordance with several rules — see Section 5
below. This is explained by the fact that the set of all the arbitrage rules (i, j, ·) having the same first two indices
i, j, in general, contains more than one element.
Investigation of convergence of the procedures (7) has very much in common with investigation of the joint/gen-
eralized spectral radius of the family of all the matrices Bω, see, e.g., Jungers (2009) and bibliography therein.
So, a great variety of results from the theory of asynchronous systems and from the theory of the joint/generalized
spectral radius might be helpful here.
Clearly the arbitrage procedure (7) may have limiting fixed states (with respect to all the matrices Bω) if and
only if the eigenspaces of the matrices Bω, corresponding to the eigenvalue 1, have nontrivial intersection F. To
find this subspace F it is necessary to solve the following system of linear equations:
x = Bωx, ∀ ω = (i, j, k) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ d, k 6= i, j.
Lemma 3. The subspace F of common fixed points of all the matrices {Bω} consists of the column-vectors x =
(xij)
T satisfying
xij = −x1i + x1j , 2 ≤ i < j ≤ d,
where x12, x13, . . . , x1d are free variables.
Proof. By induction with respect to d ≥ 3.
1Recall that always i < j and k 6= i, j.
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Remark 5. By Lemma 3, one can assert that a skew-symmetric matrix A is unchangeable by application of any
arbitrage rule if and only if it has the following form:
A =

0 a12 a13 a14 . . . a1,d−1 a1d
. . . 0 a13 − a12 a14 − a12 . . . a1,d−1 − a12 a1d − a12
. . . . . . 0 a14 − a13 . . . a1,d−1 − a13 a1d − a13
. . . . . . . . . 0 . . . a1,d−1 − a14 a1d − a14
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 a1d − a1,d−1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

,
where the subdiagonal elements are defined by skew-symmetry and so are ignored.
Lemma 4. The matrix
P =
∑
2≤j≤d
e1je
T
1j +
∑
2≤i<j≤d
eij(e
T
1j − eT1i) (10)
is a projector on the subspace F. The vectors
f i = Pe1i =
∑
1≤j<i
eji −
∑
i<j≤d
eij , i = 2, 3, . . . , d,
where the second sum is assumed to vanish when i = d, form a basis of F.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3 and Remark 5.
Let us define in the space Rd(d−1)/2 a new system of coordinates by passing from the vectors x = (xij)T to the
vectors y = (yij)
T in accordance with the rule
yij =
{
xij for 1 = i < j ≤ d;
xij + x1i − x1j for 2 ≤ i < j ≤ d.
(11)
Then the inverse change of variables is defined as
xij =
{
yij for 1 = i < j ≤ d;
yij − y1i + y1j for 2 ≤ i < j ≤ d.
(12)
Remark, that in terms of the variables y, the subspace F of common fixed points of the matrices {Bω} can be
characterised as follows:
F = {y = (yij) : yij = 0 for 2 ≤ i < j ≤ d} .
Relations (11) and (12) can be rewritten in matrix form
y = Q−1x, x = Qy,
where
Q = I +
∑
2≤i<j≤d
eij(e
T
1j − eT1i), Q−1 = I −
∑
2≤i<j≤d
eij(e
T
1j − eT1i). (13)
Since the identity matrix I allows the representation
I =
∑
1≤i<j≤d
eije
T
ij =
∑
2≤j≤d
e1je
T
1j +
∑
2≤i<j≤d
eije
T
ij ,
then by (10) we have
Q =
∑
2≤i<j≤d
eije
T
ij + P.
Therefore
f i = Pe1i = Qe1i, i = 2, 3, . . . , d,
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and then
e1i = Q
−1f i, i = 2, 3, . . . , d.
Because each of the vectors f i, i = 2, 3, . . . , d, is a fixed point of each of the matrices Bω, i.e.,
f i = Bωf i, i = 2, 3, . . . , d, ∀ ω,
then each of the matrices Q−1BωQ takes the block-triangular form:
Dω := Q
−1BωQ =
(
I Fω
0 Gω
)
, (14)
where
e1i = Dωe1i, i = 2, 3, . . . , d, ∀ ω,
To describe the structure of the matrices Dω in more detail, make use of the representations (9) and (13), and
of the fact that eTijemn = 1 if and only if i = m and j = n, whereas e
T
ijemn = 0 in other cases.
Case 1 = k < i < j. By (9), in this case Bω = I − eij(eTij + eT1i − eT1j), from which
Dω = Q
−1BωQ
=
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
I − eij(eTij + eT1i − eT1j)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I −
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
eij(e
T
ij + e
T
1i − eT1j)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I − eij(eTij + eT1i − eT1j)
(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I − eij(eTij + eT1i − eT1j)− eij(eTij + eT1i − eT1j)
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
= I − eij(eTij + eT1i − eT1j) − eij(eT1j − eT1i) = I − eijeTij .
Case 1 < k < i < j. By (9), in this case Bω = I − eij(eTij + eTki − eTkj), from which
Dω = Q
−1BωQ
=
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
I − eij(eTij + eTki − eTkj)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I −
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
eij(e
T
ij + e
T
ki − eTkj)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I − eij(eTij + eTki − eTkj)
(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I − eij(eTij + eTki − eTkj)− eij(eT1j − eT1i)− eij(eT1i − eT1k) + eij(eT1j − eT1k)
= I − eij(eTij + eTki − eTkj) = Bω.
Case 1 = i < k < j. By (9), in this case Bω = I − e1j(eT1j − eT1k − eTkj), from which
Dω = Q
−1BωQ
=
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
I − e1j(eT1j − eT1k − eTkj)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I −
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
e1j(e
T
1j − eT1k − eTkj)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I −
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
e1j(e
T
1j − eT1k − eTkj)− e1j(eT1j − eT1k)
)
= I +
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
e1je
T
kj = I +
(
e1j +
∑
j<n
ejn −
∑
2≤m<j
emj
)
eTkj .
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Case 1 < i < k < j. By (9), in this case Bω = I − eij(eTij − eTik − eTkj), from which
Dω = Q
−1BωQ
=
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
I − eij(eTij − eTik − eTkj)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I −
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
eij(e
T
ij − eTik − eTkj)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I − eij(eTij − eTik − eTkj)
(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I − eij(eTij − eTik − eTkj)− eij(eT1j − eT1i) + eij(eT1k − eT1i) + eij(eT1j − eT1k)
= I − eij(eTij − eTik − eTkj) = Bω.
Case 1 = i < j < k. By (9), in this case Bω = I − e1j(eT1j − eT1k + eTjk), from which
Dω = Q
−1BωQ
=
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
I − e1j(eT1j − eT1k + eTjk)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I −
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
e1j(e
T
1j − eT1k + eTjk)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I −
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
e1j(e
T
1j − eT1k + eTjk) + e1j(eT1k − eT1j)
)
= I −
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
e1je
T
jk = I −
(
e1j +
∑
j<n
ejn −
∑
2≤m<j
emj
)
eTjk.
Case 1 < i < j < k. By (9), in this case Bω = I − eij(eTij − eTik + eTjk), from which
Dω = Q
−1BωQ
=
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
I − eij(eTij − eTik + eTjk)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I −
(
I −
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)(
eij(e
T
ij − eTik + eTjk)
)(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I − eij(eTij − eTik + eTjk)
(
I +
∑
2≤m<n≤d
emn(e
T
1n − eT1m)
)
= I − eij(eTij − eTik + eTjk)− eij(eT1j − eT1i) + eij(eT1k − eT1i)− eij(eT1k − eT1j)
= I − eij(eTij − eTik + eTjk) = Bω.
It is convenient to unite the obtained relations into a single formula:
Dω =

I − eijeTij for 1 = k < i < j;
I − eij(eTij + eTki − eTkj) = Bω for 1 < k < i < j;
I +
(
e1j +
∑
j<n ejn −
∑
2≤m<j emj
)
eTkj for 1 = i < k < j;
I − eij(eTij − eTik − eTkj) = Bω for 1 < i < k < j;
I −
(
e1j +
∑
j<n ejn −
∑
2≤m<j emj
)
eTjk for 1 = i < j < k;
I − eij(eTij − eTik + eTjk) = Bω for 1 < i < j < k.
(15)
Now, to compute the matrix Fω, it is necessary to retain in the right-hand part of (15) only the summands of
the form emne
T
pq in which m = 1 and n, p, q > 1. Similarly, to compute the matrix Gω it is necessary to retain in
the right-hand part of (15) only the summands of the form emne
T
pq in which m,n, p, q > 1. In doing so one should
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keep in mind that I =
∑
1≤m<n≤d emne
T
mn. This results in
Fω =

0 for 1 ≤ k < i < j,
e1je
T
kj for 1 = i < k < j,
0 for 1 < i < k < j,
−e1jeTjk for 1 = i < j < k,
0 for 1 < i < j < k
and
Gω =

I − eijeTij for 1 = k < i < j,
I − eij(eTij + eTki − eTkj) for 1 < k < i < j,
I +
(∑
j<n ejn −
∑
2≤m<j emj
)
eTkj for 1 = i < k < j,
I − eij(eTij − eTik − eTkj) for 1 < i < k < j,
I −
(∑
j<n ejn −
∑
2≤m<j emj
)
eTjk for 1 = i < j < k,
I − eij(eTij − eTik + eTjk) for 1 < i < j < k.
(16)
Naturally, in (16), in contrast to (15), the identity matrix I acts in the subspace spanned over the vectors emn,
2 ≤ m < n ≤ d, and therefore it is representable as I = ∑2≤m<n≤d emneTmn.
Remark 6. In formulae (15) and (16) the sums corresponding to an empty set of indices are assumed to vanish.
For instance,
∑
j<n ejn = 0 if j = d or
∑
2≤m<j emj = 0 if j = 2.
Remark 7. The idea of highlighting the matrices Gω is to lower the dimension of the studied matrices since,
according to (14), the behaviour of the products of matrices Gω essentially determines the properties of the products
of matrices Dω and Bω.
5. Case d = 4
The detailed analysis of the FX currency market with 4 trader-arbitragers, i.e., when d = 4, was fulfilled in
Kozyakin et al. (2010) and Cross et al. (2012). Recall some related results. In this case the matrix A is of the form
A =

0 a12 a13 a14
−a12 0 a23 a24
−a13 −a23 0 a34
−a14 −a14 −a34 0
 .
In terms of the upper off-diagonal elements, the arbitrage rules can be written as follows:
(123) : a12,new = a13 − a23, other elements unchanged,
(124) : a12,new = a14 − a24, other elements unchanged,
(132) : a13,new = a12 + a23, other elements unchanged,
(134) : a13,new = a14 − a34, other elements unchanged,
(142) : a14,new = a12 + a24, other elements unchanged,
(143) : a14,new = a13 + a34, other elements unchanged,
(231) : a23,new = −a12 + a13, other elements unchanged,
(234) : a23,new = a24 − a34, other elements unchanged,
(241) : a24,new = −a12 + a14, other elements unchanged,
(243) : a24,new = a23 + a34, other elements unchanged,
(341) : a34,new = −a13 + a14, other elements unchanged,
(342) : a34,new = −a23 + a24, other elements unchanged.
The subspace of fixed points F consists of all the vectors x = (xij)T , coordinates of which satisfy
x12 = x13 − x23, x12 = x14 − x24, x13 = x12 + x23, x13 = x14 − x34,
x14 = x12 + x24, x14 = x13 + x34, x23 = −x12 + x13, x23 = x24 − x34,
x24 = −x12 + x14, x24 = x23 + x34, x34 = −x13 + x14, x34 = −x23 + x24.
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This system has redundant equations. In particular, all the equations containing the minus sign are redundant.
By removing them we obtain:
x13 = x12 + x23, x14 = x12 + x24, x14 = x13 + x34, x24 = x23 + x34.
Here one of the equations determining x14 is also redundant. By removing it, we obtain the final set of independent
equations defining the subspace F:
x13 = x12 + x23, x14 = x13 + x34, x24 = x23 + x34.
By choosing x12, x13 and x14 as independent variables, the remaining variables can be defined by the equalities
x23 = −x12 + x13, x24 = −x12 + x14, x34 = −x13 + x14.
The form of the matrices Bω, Dω and Gω for this case is given in Appendix A.
As was noted in Kozyakin et al. (2010) and Cross et al. (2012), in the case d = 4 the arbitrage process may be
non-convergent for some periodical sequence of the arbitrage rules. To support this claim let us consider the set
of all vectors each of which is mapped by some of the matrices Gω to zero. Direct calculations show that, up to
non-negative factors, this set consists of the following 12 vectors:
s1 =
 11
0
 , s2 =
 10
−1
 , s3 =
 01
1
 , s4 =
 10
0
 , s5 =
 01
0
 , s6 =
 00
1
 ,
s7 = −s1, s8 = −s2, s9 = −s3, s10 = −s4, s11 = −s5, s12 = −s6,
Moreover, as is easily verified, the set
S = co {±s1,±s2,±s3,±s4,±s5,±s6}
is mapped by each of the matrices Gω into itself and is a body, i.e., contains interior points. Hence, S is a unit ball
of some norm ‖ · ‖∗ for which
‖Gω‖∗ ≤ 1, ∀ω. (17)
So, the set of matrices {Gω} is neutrally stable and, it seems, there is the possibility that all products of
matrices Gω are convergent. In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 it is shown that this is not the case.
Remark 8. By (14) the following representation is valid
Bω = Q
(
I Fω
0 Gω
)
Q−1.
From here, and from the estimate (17), it then follows that the norm of any products of the matrices Bω may
grow no faster than cn with some constant c, where n is the number of factors Bω in the product. Example 5.2
demonstrates that such a rate of growth of products of the matrices Bω, in the case d = 4, is really achievable.
5.1. Example
Consider the following sequence of the arbitrage rules
ω(1) = (1, 4, 2), ω(2) = (1, 2, 3), ω(3) = (3, 4, 1), ω(4) = (1, 4, 2),
ω(5) = (1, 3, 4), ω(6) = (2, 4, 3), ω(7) = (2, 3, 1), ω(8) = (3, 4, 2),
ω(9) = (2, 4, 1), ω(10) = (1, 3, 4), ω(11) = (3, 4, 2), ω(12) = (1, 4, 3),
ω(13) = (2, 3, 4), ω(14) = (1, 3, 2), ω(15) = (1, 2, 4), ω(16) = (1, 4, 3),
and extend it by periodicity. Set also x0 = s1, and build recurrently the sequence
xn = Gω(n)xn−1, n = 1, 2, . . . , 16.
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Then
x0 = s1, x1 = Gω(1)x0 = G(142)x0 = s2,
x2 = Gω(2)x1 = G(123)x1 = −s3, x3 = Gω(3)x2 = G(341)x2 = s5,
x4 = Gω(4)x3 = G(142)x3 = s6, x5 = Gω(5)x4 = G(134)x4 = s4,
x6 = Gω(6)x5 = G(243)x5 = s1, x7 = Gω(7)x6 = G(231)x6 = −s5,
x8 = Gω(8)x7 = G(342)x7 = s3, x9 = Gω(9)x8 = G(241)x8 = s6,
x10 = Gω(10)x9 = G(134)x9 = s4, x11 = Gω(11)x10 = G(342)x10 = s2,
x12 = Gω(12)x11 = G(143)x11 = s1, x13 = Gω(13)x12 = G(234)x12 = s1,
x14 = Gω(14)x13 = G(132)x13 = s3, x15 = Gω(15)x14 = G(124)x14 = −s2,
x16 = Gω(16)x15 = G(143)x15 = −s1.
Continuing building, we will obtain a 32-periodic sequence xn. It is not difficult to see that the sequence of
products of the corresponding matrices Bω:
Hn = Bω(n)Hn−1, H0 = I, n = 1, 2, . . . ,
will be also 32-periodic and non-convergent to any limit.
5.2. Example
Consider the following sequence of the arbitrage rules
ω(1) = (1, 4, 3), ω(2) = (3, 4, 1), ω(3) = (3, 4, 2), ω(4) = (1, 4, 2),
ω(5) = (1, 2, 4), ω(6) = (2, 3, 1), ω(7) = (1, 3, 2), ω(8) = (2, 4, 3),
ω(9) = (1, 3, 4), ω(10) = (2, 4, 1), ω(11) = (1, 2, 3), ω(12) = (2, 3, 4),
and extend it by periodicity. Set also x0 = s1, and build recurrently the sequence
xn = Gω(n)xn−1, n = 1, 2, . . . , 12.
Then
x0 = s1, x1 = Gω(1)x0 = G(143)x0 = s1,
x2 = Gω(2)x1 = G(341)x1 = s1, x3 = Gω(3)x2 = G(342)x2 = s1,
x4 = Gω(4)x3 = G(142)x3 = s2, x5 = Gω(5)x4 = G(124)x4 = s2,
x6 = Gω(6)x5 = G(231)x5 = −s6, x7 = Gω(7)x6 = G(132)x6 = −s6,
x8 = Gω(8)x7 = G(243)x7 = −s3, x9 = Gω(9)x8 = G(134)x8 = −s1,
x10 = Gω(10)x9 = G(241)x9 = −s4, x11 = Gω(11)x10 = G(123)x10 = −s5,
x12 = Gω(12)x11 = G(234)x11 = s1.
Continuing building, we will obtain a 12-periodic sequence xn. The sequence of the corresponding products of
the matrices Gω(n) is bounded by (17) whereas the sequence of products of the matrices Bω:
Hn = Bω(n)Hn−1, H0 = I, n = 1, 2, . . . ,
is divergent, and the norms of matrices Hn have the linear rate of growth, see Remark 8.
6. Case d = 5
The full set of the matrices Bω, Dω and Gω for this case is presented in Appendix B. Direct calculations show
that the matrix
H = B(143)B(231)B(245)B(342)B(451)B(124)B(453)
is as follows
H =

0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
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and its spectral radius ρ(H) is strictly greater than 1:
ρ(H) =
1 +
√
5
2
' 1.618.
To ascertain this it suffices to note that the matrix H has the following eigenvalues (ordered by decreasing absolute
values):
−1 +
√
5
2
, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
√
5− 1
2
, 0, 0, 0.
Consider the following sequence of the arbitrage rules
ω(1) = (4, 5, 3), ω(2) = (1, 2, 4), ω(3) = (4, 5, 1), ω(4) = (3, 4, 2),
ω(5) = (2, 4, 5), ω(6) = (2, 3, 1), ω(7) = (1, 4, 3),
and extend it by periodicity. Then, as is known from the linear algebra, for almost all initial vectors2 x0, the
sequence of vectors
xn = Bω(n)xn−1, n = 1, 2, . . . ,
obtained by sequential application of the arbitrage rules ω(n) will diverge with the rate
(
1+
√
5
2
)n/7
, i.e.,
c
(
1 +
√
5
2
)n/7
‖x0‖ ≤ ‖xn‖ ≤ C
(
1 +
√
5
2
)n/7
‖x0‖,
where c, C are some positive constants. Taking into account that 1.071 ≤
(
1+
√
5
2
)1/7
≤ 1.072, the inequalities
obtained may be represented in a more descriptive form:
c 1.071n‖x0‖ ≤ ‖xn‖ ≤ C 1.072n‖x0‖. (18)
Remark 9. Relations (18) imply that for d = 5, in contrast to the case d = 4, the norms of the vectors {xn} as
well as the norms of the matrix products
Hn = Bω(n)Hn−1, H0 = I, n = 1, 2, . . . ,
may grow with the exponential rate.
Remark 10. As was shown in Remark 9, in the case d = 5, the norms of the matrix products may grow with the
exponential rate whereas in the case d = 4, according to Section 5, the norms of the matrix products may have at
most a linear rate of growth. Any sequence of arbitrage rules involving 4 traders may be treated as a particular
case of a sequence of arbitrage rules for 5 traders. Therefore in the case d = 5 one may observe also the sequences
of matrices whose norms of the products have a linear rate of growth, as well as sequences of matrices (vectors)
varying periodically, see Section 5.
When d > 5 we face an effect of “inheritance of instability” taking place in the cases d = 4, 5. In this case one
may observe all the types of behaviour of the matrix products described above as well as of the corresponding state
vectors xn: periodicity, growth at a linear rate and growth at an exponential rate.
Remark 11. If we return back from the “artificial” quantities aij to the true exchange rates
rij = e
aij , (19)
we arrive to a rather unexpected conclusion.
In the case d = 4 the exchange rates may vary periodically or grow exponentially which follows from (19) and
the results of Section 5.
2To be more specific, for all initial vectors not belonging to the linear invariant subspace of the matrix H corresponding to the set
of eigenvalues distinct from − 1+
√
5
2
.
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In the case d ≥ 5 the exchange rates also may vary periodically or grow exponentially but also, what is surprising,
they may grow in accordance with the double exponential law. For instance, in the case d = 5 formula
(18) implies
ec˜ 1.071
n ≤ ‖rn‖ ≤ eC˜ 1.072n ,
where rn is the exchange rate vector
{r12, r13, . . . , r1d, r23, r24, . . . r2d, . . . , rd−1,d}T
at the moment n.
Remark 12. As follows from the analysis undertaken, after introducing new variables bringing the matrices Bω
to block-triangular form, one obtains a set of variables, which is updated only by matrices Gω, and the behaviour of
which is thus determined only by its own history. These variables may be called, in a sense, “leading exchange
rates indices.” For d = 4, this set is constituted of the variables
a12 − a13 + a23, a12 − a14 + a24, a13 − a14 + a34, (20)
which, in terms of exchange rates, corresponds to the set of variables
r12 · r23
r13
= r12 · r23 · r31, r12 · r24
r14
= r12 · r24 · r41, r13 · r34
r14
= r13 · r34 · r41. (21)
For d = 5, the related set is constituted of the variables
a12− a13 + a23, a12− a14 + a24, a12− a15 + a25, a13− a14 + a34, a13− a15 + a35, a14− a15 + a45, (22)
and to it, in terms of exchange rates, corresponds the set of variables
r12 · r23 · r31, r12 · r24 · r41, r12 · r25 · r51, r13 · r34 · r41, r13 · r35 · r51, r14 · r45 · r51. (23)
For d = 4, the variables (20) and (21) always vary boundedly over time, while, for d ≥ 5, the variables (22)
and (23) may grow unboundedly. At the same time, the original set of exchange rates {rij} and the corresponding
set of “artificial” log-variables {aij} for d = 4, as well as for d ≥ 5, may grow unboundedly.
The intuition underlying the “leading exchange rates indices” in (23) can be explained as follows. The term
r12r23r31 can be interpreted in the following way: the 1st trader is selling the currency 1 for the currency 2,
then uses the currency 2 to buy currency 3 and then uses the currency 3 to buy his “home currency” 1. So, the
term r12r23r31 is the “arbitrage profit factor” for the 1st trader when the trades involve the “most simple” cyclic
triangular path:
1→ 2→ 3→ 1.
If this factor r12r23r31 is equals 1 then such “cyclic triangular trades” bring no profit to the 1st trader, while
when r12r23r31 6= 1 then such “cyclic triangular trades” bring profit (or loss) to the 1st trader. Hence the condition
r12r23r31 = 1
is the “no-arbitrage” condition for trading by the cyclic path 1 → 2 → 3 → 1, for the 1st trader. This “unit
circle” no-arbitrage condition was pointed out in Cournot (1929, first published in 1838).
Then (23) is simply the full set of factors whose simultaneous equality to 1 represents the no-arbitrage conditions
(NACs) for the whole set of currencies in the d = 5 case:
r12r23r31 = 1, r12r24r41 = 1, r12r25r51 = 1, r13r34r41 = 1, r13r35r51 = 1, r14r45r51 = 1. (24)
It appears that different currencies are represented in (24) non-symmetrically. But in fact there are different
NACs which are equivalent to each other.
We may introduce a measure, say,
Q = |r12r23r31 − 1|+ |r12r24r41 − 1|+ |r12r25r51 − 1|+ |r13r34r41 − 1|+ |r13r35r51 − 1|+ |r14r45r51 − 1|,
which can be interpreted as an “accumulative” NAC. The meaning is that the equality Q = 0 involves the absence
of profitable arbitrage opportunities in the whole FX market system, while the quantity Q 6= 0 characterises the
extent of profitable arbitrage opportunities in the FX market system.
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7. Concluding Remarks
The EMH implies that arbitrage operations in markets such as those for FX should be self-extinguishing. This
simplistic view of arbitrage processes may reflect a failure to consider the complex chains of arbitrage possible in
financial markets, such as those for FX, that have segmented trading platforms and fragmented information. In
Kozyakin et al. (2010) and Cross et al. (2012) it was shown, applying combinatorial analysis and asynchronous
systems theory, that arbitrage sequences in a 4-currency world tend to display periodicity or exponential growth
rather than being self-extinguishing. The present paper has used a log-linear reformulation of the analysis to
show that in a (d ≥ 5)-currency world, as well as inheriting the periodicity or exponential growth found in the
4-currency case, arbitrage sequences can be augmented by a double-exponential process. Thus there appears to be
a cumulative “inheritance of instability”.
The results may help to explain why extensive arbitrage trading is endemic in FX markets. The fact that the
number of currencies makes a difference is interesting: periodicity or exponential behaviour arise when you move
from 3 to 4 currencies; double exponential behaviour as well, when you move beyond 4 currencies. The Financial
Times provides daily quotes for 52 currencies against the US dollar, euro and pound sterling. But some currencies
are more important than others. BIS data indicate that trades involving the US dollar accounted for 85/200 of all
FX trades in 2010, followed by the euro (39/200), Japanese yen (19/200) and sterling (13/200), so trades involving
these four key currencies accounted for 78% of global FX turnover (BIS, 2010, p. 12). In terms of currency pairs
the leading trades are the dollar–euro, which accounted for 28% of global turnover, followed by the dollar–yen
(14%), dollar–sterling (9%), euro–yen (3%), euro–sterling (3%) and sterling–yen (3%) — see BIS (2010, p. 15). In
the terminology of Section 6 of this paper, these four currencies may be called “leading currencies.” In a world
containing just these four leading currencies, arbitrage operations can display periodicity, thus being bounded, or
“mild” exponential growth. Once we move to account for triangular arbitrage outside these four leading currencies
the arbitrage sequences may be unbounded, displaying “explosive” double exponential behaviour. In practice
central banks often intervene to attempt to prevent exchange rates exceeding certain bounds. The history of
financial crises, however, is replete with examples of central bank interventions in FX markets being unsuccessful,
the central banks being eventually obliged to abandon their exchange rate pegs or target ranges.
The “leading exchange rate indices,” discussed at the end of Section 6 of this paper, indicate arbitrage profit
opportunities expressed in an FX trader’s “home currency” unit of account. The August 15 1971 abandonment
of the convertibility of the US dollar into gold at a fixed price of 35$ per ounce, and the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system whereby IMF member currencies were pegged to the US dollar, left the international
monetary system without a well-defined numeraire or unit of account. To fill this gap, currency-specific effective
exchange rate (EER) indices are calculated by national central banks and finance ministries, and by international
organisations such as the IMF and BIS. An EER is a geometrically weighted average of the bilateral exchange rates
for a particular currency. So, for example, the BIS currently publishes broad EERs covering 61 currencies, and
narrow EERs covering 27 currencies, using 2008–2010 international trade flow data for weights (Klau and Fung,
2006; BIS, 2012). The various EERs use the “home currency” unit of account to provide exchange rate indices
designed for a world in which there is no gold or single reserve currency anchor.
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) were created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement the gold and foreign exchange
reserves available to member central banks. The SDR was initially defined as equivalent to 0.888671 grams of fine
gold, which could be exchanged for 1 US dollar in 1969, but is now defined as a weighted value of the US dollar,
euro, pound sterling and Japanese yen, with the weights being changed every five years, expressed in US dollars
(IMF, 2012). A European Currency Unit (ECU), conceived by European Economic Community (EEC, later the
EU) in 1979, served as an EU unit of account, being a weighted value of EU member currencies, until the euro was
launched in 1999.
The governor of the People’s Bank of China recently advocated that the SDR be adopted as a global, tradeable
reserve currency (Xiaochuan, 2009). The SDR is a dollar–euro–sterling–yen currency index, expressed in US
dollars, so this is akin to the “leading exchange rate” index faced by a dollar FX trader-arbitrageur in the d = 4
case considered earlier in the present paper. Accordingly, the periodicity and exponential growth features of
arbitrage sequences involving these four currencies would apply. This suggests that central banks holding the SDR
as a tradeable reserve currency would be faced with endemic, rather than self-extinguishing, opportunities for
arbitrage profits on their FX reserve portfolios. The proposal that “the basket of currencies forming the basis for
SDR valuation should be expanded to include currencies of all major economics” (Xiaochuan, 2009, p. 3) would
exacerbate the arbitrage problem, introducing the “inheritance of instability” arising in the d ≥ 5 case considered
in the present paper.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Matrices B(ijk), D(ijk) and G(ijk) in the Case d = 4
The matrices Bω:
B(123) =

0 1 0 −1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , B(124) =

0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
B(132) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , B(134) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
B(142) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , B(143) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
B(231) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , B(234) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
B(241) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , B(243) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
B(341) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0
 , B(342) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1 1 0
 .
The matrices Q, Q−1 and Dω = Q−1BωQ take the form:
Q =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
−1 1 0 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0 1 0
0 −1 1 0 0 1
 , Q−1 =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 −1 0 1 0 0
1 0 −1 0 1 0
0 1 −1 0 0 1
 ,
D(123) =

1 0 0 −1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , D(124) =

1 0 0 0 −1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
D(132) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
 , D(134) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
 ,
D(142) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 1
 , D(143) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0
 ,
D(231) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , D(234) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
15
D(241) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , D(243) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
D(341) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
 , D(342) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1 1 0
 .
The matrices Gω:
G(123) =
(
0 0 0
−1 1 0
0 0 1
)
, G(124) =
(
1 −1 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
)
, G(132) =
(
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 1
)
,
G(134) =
(
1 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 0
)
, G(142) =
(
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 −1 1
)
, G(143) =
(
1 0 0
0 1 −1
0 0 0
)
,
G(231) =
(
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
)
, G(234) =
(
0 1 −1
0 1 0
0 0 1
)
, G(241) =
(
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
)
,
G(243) =
(
1 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 1
)
, G(341) =
(
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
)
, G(342) =
(
1 0 0
0 1 0
−1 1 0
)
.
Appendix B. Matrices B(ijk), D(ijk) and G(ijk) in the case d = 5
The matrices Bω:
B(123) =

0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(124) =

0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(125) =

0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(132) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(134) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(135) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(142) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(143) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
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B(145) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(152) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(153) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(154) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(231) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(234) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(235) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(241) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(243) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(245) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(251) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(253) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(254) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(341) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(342) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(345) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
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B(351) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(352) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
B(354) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, B(451) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
B(452) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0

, B(453) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0

.
The matrices Q, Q−1 and Dω = Q−1BωQ take the form:
Q =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1

, Q−1 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 −1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 −1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
D(123) =

1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(124) =

1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
D(125) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(132) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
D(134) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(135) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
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D(142) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

, D(143) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1

,
D(145) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

, D(152) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 1

,
D(153) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1

, D(154) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
D(231) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(234) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
D(235) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(241) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
D(243) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(245) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
D(251) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(253) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
D(254) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(341) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
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D(342) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(345) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
D(351) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(352) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
D(354) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

, D(451) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
D(452) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0

, D(453) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0

.
The matrices Gω:
G(123) =

0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(124) =

1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(125) =

1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(132) =

0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(134) =

1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(135) =

1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(142) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
 , G(143) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
 ,
G(145) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
 , G(152) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 −1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 0 0 1
 ,
G(153) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 1
 , G(154) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0
 ,
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G(231) =

0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(234) =

0 1 0 −1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(235) =

0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(241) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(243) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(245) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(251) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(253) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(254) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(341) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(342) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(345) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(351) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(352) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
G(354) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , G(451) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
 ,
G(452) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0
 , G(453) =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1 1 0
 .
The spectral radius of the matrix
G(143)G(231)G(245)G(342)G(451)G(124)G(453) =

0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −2 1 0 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0
 ,
is 1+
√
5
2 , and its eigenvalues ordered by decreasing of their modulus are:
−1 +
√
5
2
, 1,
√
5− 1
2
, 0, 0, 0.
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